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Once more, it is ordinary language with allits ambiguity that provides a clue that the concept of
definition in mathematics mightnotbe as monolithic as we are ledto believe when the claim is
made thatdefinitions are arbitrary and we can define anything any way we wish.
"Beware the double entendre" would be a good slo-
gan to summarize a recent article by Reuben Hersh-
one that ends by enticing the reader to make up slo-
gans w ith some w ords that have technical mathemati-
cal as well as ordinary language meanings.' The point
of his creative exercise is to have the reader encoun-
ter and perhaps internalize what Hersh views as an
important lesson that ma y account for difficulties stu-
dents have in learning mathematics: that ordinary lan-
guage is not only filled with ambiguous meanings,
but that even when there is no ambiguity in ordinary
language, there is generally either no connection or a
tenuous one between that meaning and the math-
ematicalone.
As an example of a tenuous connection, Hersh com-
ments,
If 1 say "I own a number of calcu lus
books...," 1 don't mean zero books....I
don't even mean one book. ...I mean
two or more (p.48).
Hersh claims that he now understand s that it was not
mere ignorance that accounted for the comment many
years ago by one of hi s students who asserted that
zero was not a number.
Hersh offers a litany of other ordinary language ex-
pressions that are at odds w ith mathematical mean-
ing: adding (which in ordinary language always leads
to an increase in number), difference (signaling a com-
parison in ordinary language, but not necessarily sub-
traction), multiplication (repeatedly adding so that one
arrives at some thing that is bigger than what was ini-
tially the case).
He points out that not only objects and operations but
the logic of requests or demands is problematic as well.
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Thus when we ask someone to show that a number
divisible by six is even, it is surely appropriate in or-
dinary usage to choose one example (like forty-two)
to demonstrate the point rather than to come up with
some general proof.
The connection between mathematics and ordinary
language can be even more tenuous however in ad-
vanced mathematics, as Hersh p oints out. He com-
ments:
.
In advanced mathematics, there's more
linguistic confusion. Surds (absurd),
irrational and imaginary numbers, sin-
gular perturbations, degenera te ker-
nels, strange attractors-all sound dan-
gerous, undesirable, things to avoid
(p .51).
It is true that the mismatch between mathematical and
everyday meanings is significant enough to warrant
our attention, and a disinclination to appreciate this
observation may very well account for problems stu-
dents have in appreciating mathematical meaning.
There are, how ever, concomitan t issu es that are either
ignored or distorted by Hersh 's program to clear up
the intended entendre- with the intention of minimiz-
ing ambiguity. They are issues that have deep conse-
quences not only for students attempting to learn new
bodies of know ledge, but for anyone attempting to
appreciate the nature of mathematical thought as well
as its intellectual history.
For this purpose, 1 would like to suggest the follow-
ing complementary slogans:
1. " BE AWARE OF THE DOUBLE ENTENDRE."
2 . " BE AWARE OF M ULTIPLE ENTENDRE. "
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BE AWARE OF THE DOUBLE ENTENDRE
Precision of meaning is one thing. An appreciation
for the evolu tion of ideas and the associated labor
pains is another. The slogan "Be Awareof (rather than
Beware) the Double Entendre" is intended to have an
ameliorative rather than a dismissive quality with re-
gard to the concept of double entendre.What do I have
in mind? While Hersh has found out that some stu-
dents have trouble understanding a concept like that
of irrational or imaginary numbers because they seek
association with such words which "sound danger-
ous, undesirable, things to av oid ," I have di scovered
that many are frustrated by a di sinclination to take
seriously the ordinary language equivalent.
Take the case of "neg a tive number" for example.
Whil e "negative" surely fits the bill of sounding dan-
gerous and is something to avoid (unless of course it
is associated with a biopsy), the Latin translation of
that concept (which pre-dated the English translation)
wa s just as foreboding and perhaps more revealing.
These numbers were originally called numeri ficti-
meaningfi ctitious numbers. The implication here is not
onl y that these numbers are dangerous, but that they
really do not exist- or if they do, their existence is
shrouded in mystery.
What can stu dents learn not by disassociating from
an English translation, but by embracing such trans-
lations with an historical and multicultural perspec-
tive? Perhaps the deepest lesson to learn is that they
are not fools if they do not immediately understand
what the concept is all about. No t singly, but taken as
a whole, words like "negative," "imaginary," "irra-
tional," "complex" with regard to numbers signal
some thing very important. That is, they suggest that
the se concepts evolved against considerable resis-
tance. They may come to appreciate that in a quite
deep sense, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." Ifour
students have trouble understanding how numbers
are extended, then it w ould be a significant source of
solace for them to appreciate that they are merely ex-
perien cing the labor pains of these ideas historically.
And why should these ideas hav e had such a labor
intensive birth? Wh y were they not just accepted as
reasonable extensions of existing knowledge? What
does it mean to say, as Hersh points out, that math-
ematicians appreciate that zero may have meaning in
the above context while ordinary language suggests
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the opposite? Who are these mathematicians that ap-
preciate the meaning? Are we referring to those who
gave birth to the ideas and found themselves walk-
ing on a tight-rope, or are we referring to a twentieth
century embodiment of "mathematician ?" Are there
present day mathematicians who would have diffi-
culty with the concept of zero defining a number of
real world objects? Should there be?
One reason that each of the extensions of numbers
(beyond natural numbers-those that Kronecker
spoke of as God-given, but which Russell and Frege
attempted to humanize by establishing them on a set-
theoretic foundation) met with such resistance among
professionals is that there was an important and
healthy kind of confusion that had to be unraveled
over time. It is a sort of confusion that is not easily
conque red once and for all, but is perhaps built into
the human mind, and reappears with each new dis-
covery in all field s of inquiry. That is, in viewing an
extension of already existing concepts, how do we
connect with what exists? What do we expect of the
newly emerging idea that is in common with the pre-
vious one?
Obviously a concept (of number, for example) which
derives from an earlier one has something in common
with the earlier one.Just as obviously, however, it dif-
fers from the original one. Each extension requires that
we decide how much we want the emerging idea to
deviate from the originaL At what point is the devia-
tion so significant that w e can no longer speak of the
two concepts in the same breath?
With each extension of number, mathematicians had
to ask themselves what there wa s that was so funda-
mental about the concept from which it w as to be de-
rived that had to be held intact- such that letting it
go w ould completely destroy the concep t.
At early stages in the history of mathematics, exten-
sions were characterized by mathematicians' search
for a "v isible" thread- something linked to the real
world, or perhaps a model of some sor t that might be
a bit more abstract than what could be touched or seen.
Just as mathematicians who were confronted with the
search for some reality that linked the emerging con-
cept of numerifieti to the ear thiness of the na tural num-
bers, so our students experience discomfort when they
cannot rely upon familiar models in a number sys-
tem that is supposedly an extension of what is already
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comfortable.
We sometimes get the impression that an axiomatic
formulation of mathematics was a watershed that
enabled mathematicians to resolve this problem once
and for all. We thus might conclude erroneously that
it is our students' inability to appreciate an axiomatic
perspective that accounts for their reluctance to ac-
cept some of these extensions. We might believe that
the culprit then is an overly "concrete" hold on the
prior number system, and furthermore that the con-
crete hold is rooted in an effort to connect each idea
with ord inary language usa ge. Thus if natural num-
ber is associated with objects you can see or touch,
then it su rely is understandable that our students
would have a problem that mathematicians do not
have with zero or negative elements being numbers
at all.
But the problem does not (and did not) disappear with
the creation of an axiomatic perspective. If we think
of the natural numbers as a system satisfying Peano's
postulates, then we know that there are certain axi-
oms that such a system must satisfy. But as we extend
this system, we find ou t tha t some of the properties
must be relinquished. It is not just that we cannot
" touch" negative numbers that is problematic, but
rather that the extended system loses some proper-
ties of number that are associated with the positive
integers and such properti es are cherished by differ-
ent people in different ways. If the extension from
positive integers to integers enables us to solve some
new equations, it also raises some eyebrows. Thus, in
the extended system we can no longer hold on to
mathematical induction (a loss felt perhaps more dra-
matically in gu ise of the equivalen t well-ordering
property). Not every subset of the new system has a
least element. Similarly, an awareness that is perhaps
more intuitively understood (with machinery that
may sound less technical than mathematical induc-
tion) is challenged to the hilt when an extension from
positive to negative rationals leads us to reject the
strongly held belief that a smaller number divided by
a larger number cannot equal a larger nu mber divided
by a smaller one (as in ~ ]/1 = 1 /~1 ) .
When do we reach a point of no return-such tha t we
no longer think of the newly derived system as being
a number system at all? We know that the deeply
embedded property of commutativity had to be re~
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal#1 5
linquished under matrix multiplication. Yet, we ha ve
come to think of matrices as being a number system
of sorts.
As we depict the actual evolution of number systems,
we can share with our students the historical deb ates
that took place regarding the legitimacy of purported
extensions. But we can do more. If we engage them in
creating alternative extensions-ones that challenge
some of their own cherished properties-at what point
do our students get their backs up and say that the
system being created no longer reflects what numbers
are "really about"?
That's the sort of question that can engage our stu-
dents, once we encourage them not to by-pass the am-
biguity of ordinary langua ge and to place mathemat-
ics on a different sort of pedestal, but rather to see
how the presence of language in the evolution of ideas
is a testimony to the most human problems of cogru-
tion and emotion as well: How badly do we want
something that opens up totally new avenues to ex-
plore, and at what price will we buy it?
BE AWARE OF MULTIPLE ENTENDRE
So far, we have shown how attention to double
entendre can be advantageous not from the point of
view of making each new concept more easily under-
stood, but rather as a tool in enabling us to better un-
derstand the problematic nature of an entire collec-
tion of concepts.
There is however another way in which attention to
ordinary language can be enlightening. This has to
do less with the translation (and mistranslations) of a
family of words and grammatical uses in the domains
of ordinary language vs. mathematics, and more with
an awareness of certain concepts that are embedded
in our culture in general.
It lead s us to an issu e alluded to in the above section,
but it puts a totall y new slant on the issue. I begin
with the story of a classroom event of several years
ago.
I was teaching a talented group (sic) of graduate stu-
dents who had previously been exposed to a number
of different strategies for extending number systems.
Thus, they had postulated newly extended number
systems; they had derived new systems from old ones
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making use of concep ts such as ordered pairs of ele-
ments from the old ones; they had proved all sorts of
things about the new systems in relation to the old
ones; they knew what the concept of equivalence re-
lation was all about and had seen the relevance of that
concept to extensions; they had been exposed to the
concept of new systems having a subset isomorp hic
to the old; the y had been exposed to alternative his-
torical develop ment of the real numbers as in the case
of Dedekind's cuts vs. Weierstrass' limits.
I then proposed the following (what I thought wa s)
simple d ilemma :
The real numbers can be characterized in an axi-
oma tic way (essentially an Archimedean ordered
field, but I was careful to lay out the properties ). I
reviewed for them that wit hin that system, it is
possible to prove that there does not exist a num-
ber x so that xl =-1.
I then told them that one "popular " way of viewing
the set of complex numbers is to define that set as a
one that satisfies all the properties of the previous set,
but in addition has the following property:
There exists a number x so that r =-1.
Q uestion: How is such a contrad iction possible?
I found their answers perplexing. Many of them
claimed that the new set. the complex numbers, was
a different set than the previou s one- the real num-
bers- so that there was no implied contradiction.!
Some people seemed to believe that the problem wa s
resolved by naming the new system-as if such an act
in and of itself had the power to dissolve a contradi c-
tion . Some claimed that it is not surp rising to find out
that what we p reviously held to be impossible was in
fact possible since that is analogous to what growing
up and being educated is all about.
Many other interesting comments were made, and in
fact, encou raging students to analyze this sort of qu es-
tion in a non-threatening way served as a wonderful
Rorschach test. By examining anomalies in a specifi c
rather than in a globa l con text, ins tructors ma y un-
earth some interesting student misconceptions. That
is, if asked whether or not it would be accep table to
have a system that satisfies the two propositions X
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and not X simultaneously, they most likely would
claim that such is not possible, and in fact is an im-
portant element in the arsenal of mathematical argu-
ments.
Now there is a grain of truth in the students' reac-
tions, and I perhaps misin terpreted the ir efforts to re-
solve the problem, but I still found it difficult to un-
derstand how they could not be bothered by what
appeared to be an obvious contradiction. In fact, no
one mentioned that the new system of complex num-
bers is not merely an add-on to the old system in the
sense that everything that was assumed in the old
system was also introduced into the new.
It is not tha t no one pointed ou t that in the new sys-
tem, an important property of the old one must be
relinquished (that of orde r), but rather that no one
even entertained the possibility tha t something might
be lost even if the y could not name what it was.
Why is that? It took me a long time to come to appre-
ciate wha t might have been going on, and I have fi-
nally come to an hypothesis that seems worth taking
seriously.That is, I have come to believe that their dis-
inclination to consider the possibility tha t some thing
had to be relinquished is a functi on of one rather spe-
cific notion of progress in our cu lture. Adapting a
phrase of Piaget's that has a slightly different conno-
tati on, I ha ve dubbed th is notion of p rogress The
American Phenomenon.While there are multip le mean-
ings of progress in ordinary language, a dominant one
seems to assume that progress involves getting more
and more of what youfind desirable (like being able to
get a solution to x2 = -1 when it did not previously
exist) without ever losing anything that you previously
held worthwhile.
The fact that an extens ion of a number system pro-
vides you with something new and desirable but may
at the same time d eprive you of something you pre-
viously found desirable is not well understood . But
why so? It may not be a resul t of the fact that the tech-
nical process of extension is poorly understood from
a mathematical point of view, but ra ther because the
concept of progress in genera l is filled wi th so many
unexplored myths.
So, I am suggesting that it is not that we need to dis-
tinguish (and divorce) ordina ry language from p re-
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cisc mathematical language in order to create a more
accurate under standing of mathematical ideas. Rather
it is worth doing some analysis of words and concepts
in ordinary language that do Hotatall have mathemati-
cal counterparts, but that strongly influen ce the way
in which our students think abou t ma thematics and
mathem atical development in the first place. Progress
is one such concep t bu t there are others.
What is needed in order to fully appreciate that ex-
tension of systems ma y have a price to pa y is not only
an issue of mathematical logic. It requires simulta-
neou sly that we do some excavation on a concept of
ordinary language that is popularly viewed as unam-
biguous: the concept of progress. Once more, what
we need is to seek greater rather than lesser ambigu-
ity in order to arrive finally at a view of the concept of
progress that illuminates the interesting discomfort
we feel when popularly held principles have to be
relinquished.
I conclude with one other concep t that is a meta-math-
ematical rather than a mathematical one. Sometimes
it is our inability to appreciate fully the ambiguity of
ordinary language that prevents us from understand-
ing not only a particular mathematical concept or an
array of concepts, but rather the nature of mathemati-
cal thought itself. Consider the concept of definition.
Most of my students believe that definitions in math-
ematics are arbitrary. That is, they tell me that you
can define things any way you want.
Holding on to a narrow and unambiguous notion of
definition, they essentially see its application in math-
ematics as the replacement of one arbitrary English
word with some mathematical formulation. Thus the
slope of a line in a Cartesian co-ordinate system is
meant to be a shorthand way of replacing the change
in y values divided by the change in x values for any
two points on a straight line.
What the concept of arbitrary definition neglects to
appreciate is first of all that no one goes around just
defining things arbitrarily and that considerable spade
work is necessary in ord er to decide what is worth
de fining in the first place. That is, definitions single
out objects with a purposein mind, and frequently that
purpose is arrived at as a culminating act of inquiry
rather than as a first step (as most texts would have
us believe). In addition, of course, there are logical
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criteria that need to be unearthed before definitions
are accepted . For example, in mos t circumstances, we
do not select defin itions that we believe would lead
to contradictions. Thus the concep t of the slope of a
straight line would make little sens e if slope changed
in value depending upon which points were selected
along the line. .
But there is something deeper about the concept of
definition which does borrow from ordinary langu age
use of definition. That is, there are occasions upon
which definitions even in mathematics serve some
function other than that of stipulating one expression
for some other. That is, there are occasions upon which
definitions are descriptive in nature." Far from being
arb itrary, these definitions are intended to convey with
a degree of accuracy what it is that accords intuitively
with our beliefs.
So, for example, there are many different ways of de-
fining a circle in precise mathematical terms. Though,
as Hersh would point out, common language usage
might not distinguish carefully between points along
the rim and interior points (for example), in no case
would we expect that what we pre viously defined as
slope would satisfy the definition of circle. Such a
definition would not accord with our prior sense of
what a circle "really is." Toadopt the notion of defini-
tion in mathematics as arbitrary is to show a lack of
appreciation for the interesting range of ways the con-
cept of definition functions in ordinary language. It is
to act as if the Socratic search for "justice" or "beauty"
is a pointless venture on the grounds that any short-
hand expression would do.
Once more, it is ordinary language with all its ambi-
guity that provides a clue that the concept of defini-
tion in mathematics might not be as monolithic as we
are led to believe when the claim is made that defini-
tions are arbitrary and we can define anything any
way we wish.
CONCLUSION
So Hersh, in his delightful essay, reminds us that or-
dinary language can be misleading and can inter fere
with students' understanding of mathematical ideas .
That lesson itself, however, is misleading if we do not
also take into consideration that ambiguity of lan-
guage can be an asset, especially when the goal is not
necessarily to unearth the preci se meaning of a rela-
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tively narrow mathematical concept (like negative
integer), but rather to appreciate how it is that an ar-
ray of related concepts (like number) has evolved.
It is by looking at the array of ordinary language mean-
ings (and concomitant emotional baggage) associated
with numbers that we can begin to imagine a state of
mind that was behind Kronecker's reaction to
Lindemann's demonstration of the transcendental
nature of pi: Just a litt le over a century ago, he said:
What good is your beautiful investiga-
tion regarding pi? Why study such
problems, since irrational numbers do
not exist?"
The pedagogical issues are complicated here and I
have made no effort to spell this awareness ou t in
terms of any teaching program. Furthermore, I have
intentionally focused narrowly on the concept of num-
ber rather than upon the range of interesting specific
concepts that Hersh has explored. I have also not ex-
plored in general the role tha t ordinary language plays
in thinking, nor have I delved in particular into the
role of metaphorical thinking in mathematics-a
thinking that might account for the variety and rich-
ness of systems described by language such as "ring,"
"field," "ideal," and even "manifold" and "commu-
tater."!
While what I have claimed does not negate Hersh's
argument, I have attempted to point out that the am-
bigu ity of ordinary language serves a number of in-
teresting functions beyond the antiseptic one of iden-
tifying and delimiting <sic again) its potential in un-
derstanding mathematics.
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